Navigating the Thaw: EU-China Relations Poised at a Crossroads Amid Sanctions Negotiations

The complex relationship between the European Union (EU) and China stands at a potentially pivotal juncture. Negotiations reportedly in their “final stages” aim to resolve the impasse created by China’s retaliatory sanctions against EU individuals and entities, imposed in March 2021 following EU measures concerning human rights abuses in Xinjiang. These sanctions led directly to the freezing of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), a landmark deal agreed upon only months earlier. This report provides an in-depth analysis of the current diplomatic overture, its historical context, the broader geopolitical and economic landscape, stakeholder perspectives, and the potential challenges and opportunities arising from a possible resolution.

The timing of China’s willingness to lift sanctions appears strongly linked to the challenging geopolitical environment, particularly the escalating trade tensions between the United States and China under the Trump administration. Beijing seemingly views stabilizing relations with the EU, its second-largest trading partner, as a strategic imperative to counterbalance US pressure and secure vital market access. However, the scope of the potential sanctions lift remains ambiguous – whether it will encompass all targeted individuals and entities or solely the sitting Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) whose sanctioning directly triggered the CAI freeze.

While China explicitly links the sanctions removal to reviving the CAI, this outcome faces significant hurdles beyond the sanctions themselves. The European Parliament maintains that lifting sanctions is a necessary precondition but not a guarantee for ratification, citing unresolved concerns about the CAI’s substance (particularly labour rights) and the broader human rights situation in China. The European Commission remains cautious, emphasizing the EU’s de-risking strategy, persistent trade imbalances, and concerns over China’s stance on global issues like the war in Ukraine. The strategic context has shifted significantly since 2021, making the CAI’s revival politically challenging.

The EU’s approach is framed by its multifaceted “partner, competitor, systemic rival” definition of China and its overarching strategy of “de-risking” – reducing critical dependencies without full economic decoupling. This strategy is complicated by intense US-China rivalry, transatlantic tensions exacerbated by US tariff policies, and the profound impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which has heightened EU security concerns and scrutiny of China’s global role. Furthermore, internal divisions among EU Member States, reflecting differing economic interests and threat perceptions, challenge the bloc’s ability to forge and maintain a unified, autonomous China policy.

Economically, the relationship is characterized by vast trade volumes but also a substantial and persistent EU trade deficit with China. While providing benefits, this interdependence also creates vulnerabilities, particularly EU reliance on China for key inputs in digital and green technologies. Structural economic issues – including China’s state subsidies, industrial overcapacity, and lack of a level playing field for foreign companies – remain major points of friction, unlikely to be resolved solely by lifting sanctions.

The upcoming EU-China Summit in Beijing in July 2025, marking 50 years of diplomatic relations, offers a platform for high-level dialogue but is expected to yield more symbolic gestures than substantive breakthroughs, given the deep-seated divergences. Perspectives on the potential rapprochement vary widely among EU institutions, political groups, Member States, businesses prioritizing market stability, and civil society organizations focused on human rights.

Ultimately, the potential “reset” appears limited. While lifting sanctions would remove a significant irritant, it does not address the fundamental economic, political, and value-based conflicts. The EU must navigate these negotiations carefully, leveraging China’s current motivations while upholding its own interests and values, pursuing its de-risking agenda, striving for internal cohesion, and managing the complex triangular relationship with Washington and Beijing.

I. The Diplomatic Overture: EU-China Negotiations on Sanctions Removal

A. Status and Leadership of Negotiations

Recent reports suggest a significant diplomatic development is underway between the European Union and China. Discussions concerning the potential removal of retaliatory sanctions, imposed by Beijing on EU lawmakers and entities in 2021, are reportedly “in the final stages”. This indicates a possible breakthrough in resolving a dispute that severely strained bilateral relations and led to the collapse of a major investment agreement. A spokesperson for the European Parliament confirmed the advanced state of these talks, noting, “Discussions with the Chinese authorities are continuing and in their final stages”.

The leadership for these sensitive negotiations on the EU side rests with the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. Her direct involvement underscores the institutional importance the Parliament places on resolving the sanctions issue, which directly targeted its members and committees. President Metsola is expected to formally brief the leaders of the Parliament’s political groups once official confirmation of the sanctions removal is received from the Chinese authorities. This structured approach ensures internal coordination within the Parliament before any public announcement or further steps are taken.

The Parliament’s official framing of its objective has been consistent: “It has always been the European Parliament’s intention to have the sanctions lifted and resume relations with China”. This statement positions the Parliament not merely as a passive recipient of a Chinese offer but as an actor actively seeking a resolution to restore normal parliamentary relations. Further signaling a potential thaw, recent diplomatic activity includes talks between President Metsola and the Chinese Ambassador to the EU, Zhang Jun. Additionally, the Parliament has reportedly relaxed non-binding internal guidelines that previously restricted MEPs from engaging with certain Chinese officials, a move interpreted as a symbolic gesture of openness to re-engagement.

The context surrounding these “final stage” negotiations is crucial for understanding the motivations involved. Multiple sources explicitly connect this diplomatic overture to the broader geopolitical landscape, particularly the disruptive trade policies pursued by the US administration under President Donald Trump. These policies, characterized by high tariffs on goods from various countries including China and threats against the EU, have created significant global economic uncertainty and prompted nations to reassess their partnerships. Analysts observe that China, facing tariffs as high as 145% on exports to the US market and seeking alternatives, has a strong incentive to improve relations with the European Union, its second-largest trading partner. Beijing’s own rhetoric reinforces this, with calls for the EU to collaborate in resisting US “unilateral bullying”. Therefore, the offer to lift sanctions appears less driven by a reassessment of the original 2021 dispute over Xinjiang and more by immediate strategic and economic calculations aimed at securing the EU market and potentially creating distance between the EU and the US amidst escalating transatlantic and transpacific trade friction.

B. Scope of Potential Sanctions Lift: MEPs vs. Entities

The precise scope of the sanctions potentially being lifted remains a key point of ambiguity. The original Chinese countermeasures, implemented in March 2021, were extensive. They targeted ten European individuals and four distinct entities. Among the individuals were five Members of the European Parliament (MEPs): Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens/EFA, Germany), Michael Gahler (EPP, Germany), Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D, France), Ilhan Kyuchyuk (Renew Europe, Bulgaria), and Miriam Lexmann (EPP, Slovakia). These MEPs were reportedly selected due to their vocal criticism of China’s human rights record or their work related to EU-China relations and foreign interference. Since the sanctions were imposed, one of the targeted MEPs, Reinhard Bütikofer, has left the European Parliament. Other individuals included national parliamentarians from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Lithuania, as well as European academics researching China.

The four entities blacklisted by China were also significant: the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), the EU Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) based in Germany, and the Alliance of Democracies Foundation based in Denmark. The sanctions prohibited these individuals and entities, along with their families and associated companies/institutions, from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, and restricted them from conducting business with China.

Current reports indicate uncertainty about whether the Metsola-led discussions encompass the removal of all these sanctions or are focused primarily on those affecting the sitting MEPs. This distinction is important. Lifting sanctions only on the MEPs would address the direct affront to the Parliament as an institution, which was the specific trigger for the EP freezing the CAI ratification process. However, leaving sanctions in place against entities like the DROI subcommittee or the Council’s PSC, or against think tanks and researchers, would mean that significant restrictions remain. Some reports suggest China might propose an asymmetrical removal, offering to lift several of its sanctions for each one lifted by the EU, reflecting the larger number of targets on Beijing’s list compared to the EU’s original Xinjiang sanctions list.

This ambiguity regarding the scope likely serves purposes for both sides. For China, offering a partial lift, potentially focusing on MEPs first, allows it to make a significant goodwill gesture directly addressing the Parliament’s primary grievance without immediately conceding on all fronts. It keeps leverage by maintaining sanctions on other entities and avoids appearing to fully capitulate. For the European Parliament, securing the removal of sanctions against its sitting members would represent a tangible institutional victory and fulfill its stated aim of resuming normal relations. It might also allow the EP leadership to sidestep, at least temporarily, the more complex issue of demanding reciprocity for sanctions on entities like DROI or PSC, especially given that the EU’s own sanctions on Chinese officials remain in place. A partial lift focused on MEPs could thus represent a pragmatic path forward, allowing both sides to claim progress while deferring the resolution of the full set of sanctions.

C. Official Stances on CAI Revival Post-Sanctions Lift

The potential lifting of Chinese sanctions is inextricably linked in discourse and motivation to the fate of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Beijing’s primary aim in offering this concession is widely interpreted as an attempt to unfreeze and ultimately revive the CAI, which has been stalled since May 2021. Numerous sources identify the hope of reopening dialogue on the CAI as the key driver behind China’s goodwill gesture.

However, the official position of the European Parliament is clear and has been formally established through resolutions adopted in May 2021. These resolutions state unequivocally that any consideration of the CAI, including discussions on its ratification, is “justifiably frozen” as long as China’s retaliatory sanctions remain in place. MEPs across major political groups have demanded that China lift the sanctions before the Parliament will engage with the agreement. This remains a firm precondition.

Crucially, fulfilling this precondition does not automatically guarantee the CAI’s ratification. The same EP resolutions explicitly state that the demand to lift sanctions is “without prejudice to the final outcome of the CAI ratification process”. This means that even if Beijing removes the sanctions, the Parliament reserves the right to reject the CAI based on other factors. MEPs have clearly indicated they will take the broader human rights situation in China, including developments in Hong Kong and the ongoing concerns in Xinjiang, into account when deciding whether to endorse the agreement. Furthermore, substantive criticisms of the CAI itself, particularly regarding perceived weaknesses in provisions on labour rights and the enforceability of commitments on forced labour, remain unaddressed and would likely resurface in any renewed ratification debate.

The European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, has adopted a notably cautious and non-committal stance. When directly asked whether the diplomatic progress on sanctions could justify rescuing the CAI, a Commission spokesperson employed evasive language, stating, “We’ll cross that bridge when we’re that far”. While the Commission acknowledges the potential economic benefits the CAI was designed to deliver, its recent communications consistently highlight persistent concerns. These include China’s continued support for Russia amidst the war in Ukraine, the risks of the EU market being flooded with cheap Chinese goods due to US tariffs and Chinese overcapacity, and the fundamental need to rebalance the bilateral economic relationship. Significantly, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen remarked in March 2023 that the CAI had not even featured in discussions during high-level meetings with President Xi Jinping, suggesting it had effectively fallen off the active agenda.

Indeed, several analysts and EU officials assess that the CAI faces even greater political obstacles today than it did in 2021, prior to the sanctions dispute. The geopolitical environment has become more polarized, the EU has firmly embraced its “de-risking” strategy, and the “systemic rival” dimension of the relationship has gained prominence. Consequently, some view the CAI, in its current form, as politically unviable, irrespective of the sanctions issue. China’s calculation that lifting sanctions will pave the way for CAI ratification may be overly optimistic. While removing the sanctions is a necessary first step for any normalization of relations between the EP and China, it appears insufficient on its own to resurrect the investment deal. The EP maintains conditionality beyond sanctions, the Commission expresses significant reservations tied to broader strategic concerns, and the underlying criticisms of the CAI itself persist. The sanctions may have been the catalyst that froze the deal, but the geopolitical and normative shifts since 2021, coupled with the CAI’s inherent controversies, represent formidable, potentially insurmountable, barriers to its revival. China might be mistaking the removal of a procedural blockade for the resolution of fundamental substantive and political objections within the EU.

II. Background: The 2021 Sanctions Impasse and the Frozen CAI

A. The EU’s Xinjiang Sanctions and China’s Retaliation

The current diplomatic maneuvering around sanctions has its roots in a significant escalation of tensions in March 2021. At that time, the EU Council utilized its newly established EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR) for one of its first major applications. Invoking concerns over widespread and systematic human rights violations against the Uyghur Muslim minority and other ethnic groups in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the EU imposed restrictive measures on four Chinese officials and one entity. The targeted entity was the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Public Security Bureau, implicated in managing detention centers, while the officials held positions related to the administration and security apparatus in the region. This action marked the EU’s first imposition of human rights-related sanctions on China since the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.

The EU’s measures, implemented under the GHRSR framework adopted in December 2020, involved travel bans preventing the listed individuals from entering the EU and asset freezes on any funds or economic resources they held within the bloc. EU entities were also prohibited from making funds available to those listed. This move was not taken in isolation; it was part of a coordinated action with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, which announced similar sanctions against Chinese officials linked to the Xinjiang abuses on the same day.

Beijing’s reaction was swift and forceful. Describing the EU’s actions as based on “nothing but lies and disinformation” and constituting gross interference in China’s internal affairs, the Chinese government announced its own retaliatory sanctions almost immediately. China’s countermeasures targeted a broader and arguably more symbolic group than the EU’s specific list. Ten European individuals and four entities were placed on China’s sanctions list. The individuals included five MEPs known for their critical stances on China (Reinhard Bütikofer, Michael Gahler, Raphaël Glucksmann, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Miriam Lexmann), along with national parliamentarians from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Lithuania, and two European scholars (one German, one Swedish) specializing in China studies. The entities targeted were the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), the Council of the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Germany-based Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), and the Denmark-based Alliance of Democracies Foundation. These sanctions barred the individuals and their families from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, and prohibited them, along with associated companies and institutions, from doing business with China. China subsequently imposed similar sanctions on individuals and entities in the UK, Canada, and the US following their coordinated measures.

The EU institutions strongly condemned China’s retaliation. They framed their own sanctions as legitimate, proportionate measures grounded in international law and targeted specifically at addressing documented, severe human rights violations. In contrast, they characterized China’s countermeasures as baseless, arbitrary, lacking any legal justification, and constituting a direct attack on fundamental freedoms – particularly freedom of speech and academic research – and on the democratic institutions of the EU itself. This fundamental difference in the nature and justification of the sanctions highlighted the clashing perspectives between the EU’s values-based foreign policy approach, utilizing tools like the GHRSR to address human rights abuses globally, and China’s emphasis on state sovereignty, non-interference, and its intolerance of external criticism, particularly regarding issues it defines as internal affairs like Xinjiang. The EU targeted specific alleged perpetrators of abuses under a legal framework, while China targeted critics and democratic institutions in a move widely seen as punitive and aimed at silencing dissent.

B. The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI): A Stalled Ambition

The sanctions dispute erupted just months after the EU and China had seemingly achieved a major milestone in their economic relationship: the conclusion “in principle” of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in December 2020. This agreement was the culmination of seven years of complex negotiations, spanning 35 rounds. For the EU, the CAI represented a key strategic objective, intended to leverage the enhanced competence in foreign direct investment granted by the Lisbon Treaty to create a unified framework for investment relations with China. It aimed to replace the patchwork of older Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) that most individual EU Member States had previously signed with China.

The core goals of the CAI, from the EU perspective, were threefold:

1. Improved Market Access: To secure an unprecedented level of access for EU investors to the Chinese market, allowing EU companies to establish new ventures or acquire existing ones in key sectors previously subject to restrictions. Commitments included removing joint venture requirements in sectors like automotive and health.
2. Level Playing Field: To ensure fairer treatment for EU companies operating in China by addressing long-standing friction points. This involved securing Chinese commitments on the behaviour of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), increasing transparency regarding subsidies (especially in services), and prohibiting forced technology transfers.
3. Sustainable Development: To incorporate commitments related to environmental protection and labour standards, encouraging responsible investment. Notably, China agreed to make “continued and sustained efforts” towards ratifying outstanding International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions concerning forced labour (No. 29 and No. 105).

Despite being hailed initially as a landmark achievement, the CAI faced considerable criticism within the EU even before the sanctions dispute derailed its ratification. A major point of contention was the perceived inadequacy of the provisions regarding labour rights, particularly given the well-documented allegations of forced labour in Xinjiang. Critics argued the commitment to “make efforts” towards ratifying ILO conventions lacked concrete deadlines or enforcement mechanisms. Concerns were also raised about the actual value of the market access concessions, with some analysts suggesting they largely codified openings already made by China unilaterally or under WTO commitments. Furthermore, the agreement notably excluded provisions on investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), which were deferred for future negotiations intended to conclude within two years of the CAI’s signature.

The timing of the agreement’s conclusion, rushed through in the final days of the German EU Council Presidency and just before the inauguration of the Biden administration in the US, also drew criticism. It was seen by some as potentially undermining efforts to build a coordinated transatlantic approach towards China. This confluence of factors – substantive criticisms regarding labour rights and the real value of concessions, procedural concerns about the exclusion of investment protection, and geopolitical unease about the timing – meant the CAI was already on politically shaky ground within the EU before the sanctions crisis. The European Parliament had already signalled its intention to scrutinize the deal carefully, particularly in light of the human rights situation in China. The subsequent sanctions dispute provided a politically potent and widely accepted reason for the Parliament to halt the ratification process for a deal whose passage was, in reality, never assured.

C. Impact of the Sanctions Dispute on Bilateral Relations

The imposition of retaliatory sanctions by China in March 2021 had immediate and profound consequences for EU-China relations, most notably derailing the CAI. In May 2021, the European Parliament responded directly to the sanctioning of its members and subcommittee by voting overwhelmingly (599 in favour, 30 against, 58 abstentions) to formally freeze the legislative process for considering and ratifying the CAI. The Parliament made it clear that no progress would be made on the agreement as long as the Chinese sanctions remained in place.

This move effectively put the CAI into a “deep freeze”, where it has remained despite repeated attempts by Beijing to revive discussions. The sanctions dispute marked a significant deterioration in the overall political climate between Brussels and Beijing. EU High Representative Josep Borrell noted that the Chinese sanctions “created a new atmosphere… a new situation” in EU thinking towards China. It led to a sharp increase in strategic mistrust within EU institutions and many Member State capitals.

The practicalities of diplomatic engagement were also hampered. The European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the PRC declared it could not return to normal work while its members were sanctioned. Internal EP guidelines were introduced restricting contacts with Chinese officials, although these have reportedly been eased recently as negotiations progressed. More broadly, the heightened tensions and subsequent freezing of the CAI negatively impacted business confidence among European companies operating in or considering investing in China. This was compounded by what many businesses perceived as an increasingly restrictive regulatory and political environment within China itself since 2021, characterized by stringent regulations, government pressure, and geopolitical factors. Reflecting these strains, bilateral trade in goods experienced a notable dip, falling by 12% in 2022 before seeing a slight rebound, although the EU’s trade deficit remained near record levels.

The 2021 sanctions episode served as a critical juncture, arguably solidifying the “systemic rival” component of the EU’s 2019 strategic outlook on China (partner, competitor, systemic rival). While the EU continued to acknowledge the need for partnership on global issues and the reality of economic competition, China’s direct targeting of EU democratic institutions (the Parliament and Council bodies) and the consequent collapse of the CAI – the flagship initiative for economic cooperation – inevitably shifted the balance. The perception of China as a rival promoting a different, often challenging, model of governance gained prominence. This, in turn, accelerated the EU’s focus on building resilience, enhancing defensive tools (like trade defence instruments and investment screening), and pursuing its “de-risking” strategy to mitigate perceived vulnerabilities stemming from the relationship. The sanctions dispute, therefore, did more than just freeze an agreement; it catalyzed a more cautious, defensive, and arguably more confrontational phase in the EU’s overall approach to China.

III. Geopolitical Context: Navigating Rivalry and Strategic Interests

A. The EU’s Multifaceted China Approach: Partner, Competitor, Rival, De-risking

The European Union’s contemporary relationship with China is officially guided by a complex, multifaceted framework articulated in its 2019 Strategic Outlook. This framework defines China simultaneously as a partner for cooperation on global challenges (such as climate change and global health), an economic competitor pursuing technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. This tripartite definition acknowledges the complexity and inherent tensions within the relationship, moving away from a singular focus on economic opportunity.

Since the adoption of this framework, and particularly following the events of 2021 (sanctions dispute, CAI freeze) and the geopolitical shifts triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the balance within this triptych has demonstrably shifted. The dimensions of “competitor” and “systemic rival” have gained increasing prominence in EU policy discourse and actions. This shift is driven by a growing list of EU concerns, including: persistent unfair trade and investment practices by China; the security implications of dependencies on Chinese technology and critical infrastructure; China’s deteriorating human rights record, particularly in Xinjiang and Hong Kong; and Beijing’s alignment with Moscow.

In response to these growing challenges and perceived vulnerabilities, the EU has developed and increasingly emphasized a strategy of “de-risking, not decoupling”. This strategy aims to reduce critical dependencies on China, especially in sensitive sectors vital for the EU’s green and digital transitions (e.g., renewable energy technologies, semiconductors, critical raw materials), without seeking a complete severing of economic ties. De-risking involves a range of policy tools, including diversifying supply chains, promoting domestic industrial capacity (e.g., through the EU Chips Act or Green Deal Industrial Plan), strengthening trade defence instruments against dumping and subsidies, enhancing foreign direct investment screening mechanisms, and potentially implementing controls on outbound investments and technology exports in sensitive areas. The EU’s first Economic Security Strategy, released in 2023, further operationalized this approach.

Underpinning this strategic recalibration is the EU’s long-standing ambition to achieve greater “strategic autonomy”. This concept refers to the EU’s capacity to act independently on the global stage, pursuing its own interests and upholding its values without excessive reliance on other major powers, notably the United States and China. It involves developing the EU’s own capabilities (economic, technological, defence) and diversifying its partnerships. While China has officially stated its support for EU strategic autonomy, likely seeing it as a way to prevent a unified Western bloc, the practical pursuit of this goal in a world increasingly defined by US-China rivalry presents significant challenges for Brussels.

In practice, the “de-risking” agenda appears to have become the dominant operational paradigm guiding EU policy towards China. While cooperation on issues like climate change continues to be mentioned, the bulk of concrete policy initiatives and high-level rhetoric focuses on identifying and mitigating risks, addressing economic distortions, and building defensive capabilities. The 2019 triptych remains the official framework, but the emphasis has clearly shifted towards managing the competitive and rivalrous aspects of the relationship. Even the current discussions about lifting sanctions are being assessed within Brussels through the lens of whether rapprochement aligns with or potentially undermines the broader de-risking objectives. This suggests that de-risking is no longer just one component of the EU’s China strategy but the primary filter through which the challenges and complexities of the relationship are currently viewed and managed.

B. The US Factor: Transatlantic Tensions and the US-China Trade War’s Influence

The EU’s relationship with China does not exist in a vacuum; it is profoundly shaped by the overarching context of intense strategic competition between the United States and China. Actions and policies originating from Washington often have direct or indirect repercussions on EU-China dynamics, and vice versa.

The aggressive trade policies enacted by the Trump administration, particularly the imposition of substantial tariffs on a vast range of Chinese goods, represent a major external factor influencing the current EU-China landscape. These tariffs, reaching levels as high as 145% on most goods according to some reports, significantly disrupt global trade flows and put pressure on the Chinese economy. This pressure appears to be a key motivator for China’s current outreach to the EU, including the offer to lift sanctions. China explicitly attempts to leverage the friction these US policies also create with Europe, urging the EU to resist US pressure and work with Beijing to uphold multilateralism.

This situation places the EU in a complex and delicate strategic position. On one hand, aligning too closely with Washington’s confrontational approach towards China could harm the EU’s significant economic interests in the Chinese market and potentially compromise its goal of strategic autonomy. On the other hand, pursuing a rapprochement with China, especially if it involves reviving the CAI or is perceived as undermining US efforts to contain China, risks antagonizing Washington and further straining the already tense transatlantic relationship, particularly under an “America First” administration. Brussels has sought to navigate this dilemma by publicly stating that it will not agree to decouple from the Chinese economy as a condition for obtaining relief from US tariffs.

The Trump administration’s policies thus act as both an accelerator and a complicating factor. US tariffs create economic pain for China, making Beijing more amenable to concessions towards the EU (like lifting sanctions) to secure alternative markets and partnerships. Simultaneously, US pressure on the EU regarding China, coupled with broader transatlantic disagreements on trade and security, makes Brussels wary of appearing too accommodating towards Beijing. This reinforces the logic of the EU’s de-risking strategy, not just from China, but arguably also from the volatility associated with US policy. The US factor, therefore, simultaneously opens a window for potential tactical EU-China alignment while strengthening the underlying drivers for the EU’s pursuit of greater strategic distance and resilience relative to both superpowers.

C. The Shadow of the War in Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has cast a long shadow over EU-China relations, introducing another layer of complexity and mistrust. China’s refusal to condemn the invasion, its diplomatic alignment with Moscow, and concerns about potential material support for Russia’s war effort have significantly strained ties with Brussels.

The EU increasingly perceives China and Russia as politically linked actors challenging the existing rules-based international order and European security.⁴³ Official EU statements and high-level dialogues consistently raise the Ukraine issue, urging China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to use its influence on Russia to end the aggression and to engage constructively with peace initiatives like Ukraine’s Peace Formula. The war has also starkly highlighted the risks associated with strategic dependencies on autocratic states, reinforcing the rationale behind the EU’s de-risking agenda and its focus on enhancing economic and energy security.

China’s stance on Ukraine acts as a significant multiplier of the pre-existing trust deficit between the EU and Beijing. It directly contradicts China’s narrative of being a responsible global power committed to peace and stability and undermines its efforts to portray itself as a reliable partner for Europe. For many within the EU, particularly in Member States bordering Russia or strongly committed to supporting Ukraine, China’s position is a major obstacle to deepening cooperation. It provides potent ammunition for those advocating a more cautious or even confrontational approach towards Beijing and accelerates the push for de-risking. Consequently, any potential progress on economic issues, such as the lifting of sanctions, will inevitably be viewed against the backdrop of this fundamental geopolitical divergence. The Ukraine war remains a persistent point of friction and a key factor limiting the potential scope and depth of any EU-China rapprochement.

D. EU Strategic Autonomy in the Balance

The pursuit of strategic autonomy remains a central, albeit challenging, objective shaping the EU’s engagement with China and the wider world. In the context of the US-China rivalry, this translates into an effort to carve out a distinct European path, avoiding automatic alignment with either Washington or Beijing and making policy choices based on the EU’s own defined interests and values.

However, the EU is not a monolithic actor, and achieving a truly unified and autonomous foreign policy towards a power as significant as China is complicated by internal divisions among its 27 Member States. Different Member States harbor varying perspectives on the balance between the economic opportunities and the political/security risks presented by China. For example, Germany, with its significant export-oriented industries deeply integrated with the Chinese market, has historically favored a more pragmatic, economics-focused approach, although a potential future government under Friedrich Merz might adopt a tougher line. France, conversely, often emphasizes the need to protect strategic industries and pushes for more assertive EU action, such as the investigation into Chinese electric vehicle subsidies. Some Southern European countries, like Italy and Spain, have been reported as being more hesitant to join strong condemnations of China, potentially prioritizing the attraction of Chinese investment. Meanwhile, countries like Lithuania have taken principled, more confrontational stances, while others, notably Hungary, actively cultivate close ties with Beijing and sometimes obstruct unified EU positions.

These internal divergences reflect differing national economic dependencies, geopolitical outlooks, and historical experiences. They create vulnerabilities that China can potentially exploit and make it difficult for the EU to project a consistently strong and unified voice. While external pressures, such as US tariffs, might temporarily push Member States towards a common tactical response, the underlying differences in strategic priorities often resurface, hindering the development of a truly cohesive and proactive long-term China strategy. The EU’s quest for strategic autonomy, therefore, remains an ongoing process constantly tested by both external pressures from Washington and Beijing and the internal challenge of reconciling the diverse interests and perspectives of its Member States.

IV. Economic Interdependence and Friction

A. EU-China Trade Dynamics: Trends, Deficits, and Key Sectors

The economic relationship between the EU and China is one of immense scale and significance, characterized by deep interdependence but also marked structural imbalances. China stands as the EU’s second-largest trading partner for goods overall, surpassed only by the United States (though the US leads when services are included). For the EU, China is the single largest source of imported goods, accounting for roughly 20-21% of all extra-EU imports, and the third-largest destination for EU exports, receiving approximately 8-9% of goods sold outside the bloc.

Bilateral trade in goods has grown exponentially over recent decades, rising from just US$14.3 billion in 1985 to US$45.6 billion in 1994, and reaching €739 billion in 2023. This 2023 figure, however, represented a significant 14% decline from the record high of €865 billion achieved in 2022, reflecting the impact of global economic slowdown, geopolitical tensions, and potentially the initial effects of de-risking policies. Preliminary data for 2024 suggests a further slight decline, with EU exports to China valued at €213.3 billion (down 4.5% YoY according to one source ⁶³, though DG Trade reported €223.6bn exports for 2023, down 3.1% YoY) and imports at €517.8 billion (down 0.5% YoY according to one source, though DG Trade reported €515.9bn imports for 2023, down 18% YoY).

A defining feature of this trade relationship is the large and persistent EU trade deficit with China. This deficit reached an unprecedented €396 billion in 2022 before decreasing to €292 billion in 2023, according to DG Trade. Other sources using preliminary 2024 data place the deficit slightly higher at €304.5 billion. Monthly data from Eurostat confirms the ongoing imbalance, showing a combined deficit of €56.2 billion for January-February 2025. This structural deficit is a major source of concern for the EU, fueling calls for greater reciprocity and market access in China.

The trade flows are dominated by manufactured goods, particularly machinery and vehicles, on both the import and export sides. Key product categories imported by the EU from China in 2024 included electrical machinery, appliances, and parts (€96.8 billion), telecommunications and audio equipment (€60.9 billion), and office and data-processing machines (€45.9 billion). These technology-heavy categories underscore the EU’s reliance on China in critical supply chains. On the export side, top EU goods sold to China in 2023/2024 included motor vehicles, machinery, pharmaceutical products, and optical/medical apparatus. While goods trade shows a large EU deficit, the EU maintains a surplus in trade in services with China, amounting to €14.1 billion in 2023.

Table 1: EU-China Goods Trade Statistics Summary (€ Billion)

Year	EU Exports to China	EU Imports from China	Bilateral Trade Volume	EU Trade Balance with China	Data Source Notes
2022	~230.7	~626.0	~856.7	-395.3	Calculated from (2023 values & YoY changes)
2023	223.6	515.9	739.5	-292.3	DG Trade
2024 (Prelim)	213.3	517.8	731.1	-304.5	Eurostat/National via (Note: Slight YoY declines)
Jan-Feb 2025	31.8	88.0	119.8	-56.2	Eurostat (Jan: Exp 14.8, Imp 44.8; Feb: Exp 17.0, Imp 43.2)
Dec 2024	16.8	44.1	60.9	-27.3	Eurostat Seasonally Adj. (Note: Non-adj. deficit €40.1bn)

Note: Data discrepancies exist between sources (e.g., DG Trade vs. Eurostat preliminary) and methodologies (e.g., seasonally adjusted vs. non-adjusted). Figures provide indicative scale and trends.

B. Strategic Dependencies and Vulnerabilities

The sheer volume of trade, particularly the high level of imports from China, translates into significant economic dependencies for the European Union. These dependencies are increasingly viewed through a strategic lens as part of the EU’s de-risking assessment. Analysis indicates that the EU faces growing critical dependencies on China, especially in sectors crucial for its twin digital and green transitions. Imports of green technologies from China, such as solar panels and components for electric vehicle batteries, have surged in recent years.

A detailed study based on 2022 data identified 421 specific product categories (out of over 5,000) where the EU exhibited high import dependency on China. This represents a nearly threefold increase compared to the year 2000. These dependencies accounted for 12% of the EU’s total imports by share and represented a value equivalent to 2.1% of the EU’s GDP. This trend highlights a growing asymmetry, as over the same period, China significantly reduced its own import dependencies on the EU, roughly halving the number of product categories where it relied heavily on European suppliers.

The EU’s import dependencies are concentrated in specific sectors. As noted, electrical machinery and equipment, telecommunications apparatus, and automatic data processing machines are top import categories, reflecting reliance on Chinese manufacturing for electronics and digital infrastructure components. Dependencies also exist in chemicals and various other manufactured goods.⁶⁶ While concerns about critical raw materials persist, analysis suggests China’s own dependencies are increasingly shifting towards primary products like minerals (iron ore, coal) and agricultural goods (soybeans), while it has successfully reduced reliance on foreign suppliers for many intermediate and manufactured goods, including complex items like semiconductors over time.

Addressing these perceived vulnerabilities is a core objective of the EU’s de-risking strategy. Policies aimed at diversifying suppliers, fostering domestic production capacity in critical sectors (like semiconductors via the Chips Act or green tech via the Net-Zero Industry Act), and scrutinizing inbound investments are all designed to mitigate the risks associated with over-reliance on China.

Table 2: Key EU-China Trade Sectors and Dependencies (Based on 2023/2024 Data & Analysis)

Sector	Key EU Exports to China (Value/Focus)	Key EU Imports from China (Value/Focus)	EU Trade Balance (Indicative)	Identified EU Dependencies/Vulnerabilities	Identified Chinese Dependencies on EU (Indicative)
Machinery & Vehicles	High (Vehicles ~$27B, Machinery ~$51B). Strong German presence.	Very High (Electrical Machinery €97B, ADP Machines €46B).	Significant Deficit (overall)	High dependency on electronic components, consumer electronics, some industrial machinery parts.	Reduced dependency, but still relies on some high-end EU machinery & transport equipment/parts.
Electrical/Electronics/Telecoms	Moderate ($34B).	Very High (Telecoms €61B, Electrical €97B).	Large Deficit	Critical dependency on components for digital infrastructure, consumer electronics, telecoms equipment.	Decreasing dependency, focused on specific high-end components (e.g., certain semiconductors).
Chemicals	Moderate ($4B misc. chem, $3B organic). German strength.	Moderate (€96.8B includes electrical parts, but chemical imports significant).	Likely Deficit (overall)	Dependency on certain chemical inputs/APIs.	Still reliant on some specialized EU chemicals (e.g., catalysts, specific organic/inorganic compounds).
Green Tech / Renewables	Growing (e.g., components for EU manufacturing)	Very High (Solar panels, battery components, EVs). Imports “ballooned”.	Large Deficit	Critical dependency for meeting EU climate goals, risk of overcapacity/dumping from China.	Less dependent on EU, aims for self-sufficiency/export dominance.
Pharmaceuticals	Significant ($18B).	Moderate (but growing concerns about API dependency).	Likely Surplus	Potential vulnerability in Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).	Relies on some patented EU medicines and R&D.
Critical Raw Materials	Low (Ores ~$2B).	Moderate (Processed materials).	Deficit	Dependency on China for processing many CRMs essential for EU industry (not just raw extraction).	Less dependent on EU for raw materials.

Note: Values are indicative based on available snippets and classifications (SITC vs. other). Balances are estimated trends. Dependencies are qualitative.

C. Investment Flows and the CAI’s Potential Economic Impact

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows between the EU and China are substantial but significantly smaller than trade flows and have shown signs of decline recently. As of the first quarter of 2024, the cumulative stock of EU FDI in China since the year 2000 stood at €177 billion, while the stock of Chinese FDI in the EU reached €143 billion over the same period.

Recent annual flows indicate a cooling trend. EU FDI flows into China amounted to €6.4 billion in 2023, marking a sharp 29% decrease compared to 2022. Conversely, Chinese FDI flows into the EU totaled €4.7 billion in 2023, representing a 10% decline from the previous year. Interestingly, despite this overall trend and reports of record-low business sentiment among German companies in China, German FDI into China saw a notable surge in the first half of 2024, reaching €7.3 billion, already exceeding the total for the entire year 2023 (€6. billion). This highlights potential divergences in investment behaviour even within the EU.

Sectorally, EU investment in China has been concentrated in the automotive sector, basic materials, and machinery. Chinese investment in the EU has also favored the automotive sector, alongside health, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and information and communication technology (ICT). A notable shift in the pattern of Chinese FDI into Europe has occurred recently: while mergers and acquisitions (M&A) dominated until 2021, greenfield investments (building new facilities) constituted the majority in 2022 and 2023, potentially reflecting investments in areas like EV battery plants.

The potential revival of the CAI is often discussed in terms of its projected economic benefits. Original EU estimates suggested that the agreement could unlock €1.1 trillion in bilateral investment by 2030 and potentially add 0.5% to the EU’s GDP by that year. Sectors anticipated to benefit included renewable energy, automotive manufacturing (through better market access to China’s EV market), and cloud computing.

However, the practical realization of these benefits, even if the CAI were ratified today, appears increasingly uncertain. Since the agreement was concluded in principle in late 2020, numerous reports indicate that the actual market access environment for foreign companies in China has become more, not less, restrictive. European businesses cite growing challenges due to stringent regulations, increased government pressure, heightened geopolitical tensions, and a generally more politicized business environment. This deterioration in the operating climate has contributed to a plunge in investment flows and business confidence. Furthermore, China’s strategic emphasis on achieving greater self-reliance (“Made in China 2025”, focus on domestic circulation) potentially diminishes its appetite for genuine market opening in strategic sectors. Consequently, the market access and level playing field commitments secured on paper in the CAI back in 2020 might yield significantly diminished returns in the changed reality of 2025 and beyond. The economic rationale for pushing for the CAI’s revival may therefore be weaker for EU businesses today compared to when the deal was first negotiated.

D. Persistent Economic Challenges: Level Playing Field, Subsidies, Overcapacity

Beyond the specific issue of the CAI, fundamental and structural economic challenges continue to define the EU-China relationship. A core and persistent concern for the EU is the lack of a genuine level playing field for European companies operating in the Chinese market.

These challenges stem largely from China’s state-led economic model, which differs significantly from the EU’s market-based approach. China’s extensive use of industrial policies, widespread state subsidies, preferential treatment for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and requirements that can lead to forced technology transfer create significant distortions both within the Chinese market and globally. These practices contribute to massive industrial overcapacity in China in sectors like steel, aluminum, solar panels, and increasingly, electric vehicles and batteries.³² This overcapacity then spills over into international markets, often through exports priced below fair market value (dumping) or benefiting from unfair subsidies, negatively impacting producers in trading partner economies like the EU.

Addressing these distortions is a central plank of the EU’s economic security and de-risking strategy. While the CAI text included commitments related to SOEs, subsidy transparency, and forced technology transfer, skepticism remains about their effective implementation and enforcement even if the deal were active. In the absence of the CAI, the EU has increasingly relied on its autonomous Trade Defence Instruments (TDIs). The number of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations initiated by the EU, particularly targeting Chinese imports, has risen, with twice as many new investigations launched in 2023 compared to 2022. Recent examples include the high-profile anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese electric vehicles and the imposition of duties on products like glass fibre yarns and monosodium glutamate (MSG) from China. At the end of 2023, the EU had 182 trade defence measures in place, the majority targeting imports facing dumping or subsidies, protecting an estimated 500,000 direct EU jobs.

Adding to these challenges is China’s strategic drive towards greater self-sufficiency and import substitution in key technological areas. While China continues to seek foreign investment, this push for indigenous innovation can create further barriers for European companies.

The potential lifting of sanctions, while a positive diplomatic step, does little to resolve these deep-seated structural economic conflicts. The fundamental differences between the EU’s and China’s economic systems, and the resulting issues of subsidies, overcapacity, and market access asymmetry, are systemic. Therefore, regardless of progress on the sanctions front or the overall diplomatic temperature, trade friction, disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the EU’s deployment of defensive trade measures are likely to remain prominent features of the bilateral economic relationship for the foreseeable future.

V. Key Diplomatic Milestones and Future Engagements

A. The Significance of the Upcoming July 2025 EU-China Summit

A key event on the diplomatic calendar is the upcoming EU-China Summit, confirmed to be held in Beijing during the second half of July 2025. This summit holds particular significance for several reasons. Firstly, it coincides with the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and the People’s Republic of China, providing a symbolic backdrop for stocktaking and potentially setting a course for the future.

Secondly, the summit takes place amidst a period of heightened global geopolitical and economic turbulence, marked by the ongoing US-China trade war and the significant impact of US tariff policies. This context inevitably frames the summit as an opportunity for the EU and China to discuss their responses to these external pressures and potentially explore areas of limited coordination, although deep alignment remains unlikely given their own bilateral frictions.

Thirdly, the location of the summit is noteworthy. While EU-China summits typically alternate venues, this year’s meeting will again be held in China, following the previous summit in Beijing in December 2023. Reports suggest this is because Chinese President Xi Jinping declined an invitation to travel to Brussels for the summit. While logistical factors could play a role, the decision to hold consecutive summits in China might subtly signal Beijing setting the terms of engagement or reflect a calculation about the optics of high-level travel amidst global tensions.

The agenda is expected to be comprehensive, covering the full spectrum of the complex relationship. Key topics will likely include the persistent trade imbalances and market access issues pressed by the EU, the status of the sanctions negotiations and potentially the CAI, cooperation on global challenges like climate change (following previous dialogues), and critical geopolitical issues such as Russia’s war against Ukraine and tensions surrounding Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Given the weight of unresolved issues and divergent perspectives, the July summit carries considerable symbolic importance but may be limited in its potential for substantive breakthroughs. China will likely leverage the occasion to project an image of stability, partnership, and commitment to multilateralism, particularly contrasting its approach with the perceived unilateralism and volatility of the US under Trump. The EU side, represented by the Presidents of the European Council and European Commission, will focus on reiterating its core concerns regarding the economic relationship (imbalances, level playing field), pressing for progress on de-risking objectives, and articulating its position on key international security issues like Ukraine. While the formal confirmation of the sanctions lift might occur around the summit, major new agreements or a fundamental reset of the relationship appear improbable. The summit is more likely to serve as a high-level platform for managing the complex relationship, clarifying positions, and maintaining dialogue rather than achieving significant policy shifts.

B. Analysis of Recent High-Level Communications

Recent interactions between senior EU and Chinese officials provide further insight into the current state and trajectory of relations. A phone call in early April 2025 between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Chinese Premier Li Qiang generated considerable attention and fueled speculation about a potential reset after years of strained ties.

However, the official readouts released by the two sides revealed notably different tones and emphases, highlighting divergent narratives and priorities. The readout from Premier Li’s office was described as markedly optimistic, emphasizing a “momentum of steady growth” in bilateral ties. This framing aligns with China’s broader diplomatic messaging aimed at stabilizing relations and projecting partnership.

In contrast, the European Commission’s readout presented a more cautious and issue-driven perspective. While acknowledging the constructive nature of the discussion, it explicitly tempered enthusiasm. President von der Leyen stressed the “urgency for structural solutions” to rebalance the bilateral trade relationship, ensure better market access for European businesses, and address the critical issue of potential trade diversion caused by US tariffs, particularly in sectors already suffering from global overcapacity. She proposed establishing a joint mechanism to track such diversion. The Commission readout also reiterated the EU’s concerns regarding China’s stance on the war in Ukraine, calling on Beijing to intensify efforts towards a just peace.

This pattern of divergent framing is also evident in other high-level engagements. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in his interactions with various European counterparts (including the EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, and ministers from France, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, and the UK), has consistently emphasized mutual respect, mutual benefit, the importance of multilateralism, and the need to manage economic frictions through dialogue and negotiation. His rhetoric often portrays China and Europe as partners facing common challenges, implicitly positioning the US as a source of disruption. EU officials, while reciprocating the commitment to dialogue, consistently foreground the bloc’s specific concerns about economic imbalances, unfair practices, human rights, and geopolitical alignment.

This consistent difference in emphasis underscores a fundamental gap in expectations and objectives. China appears primarily focused on stabilizing the relationship, mitigating the impact of US policies, securing market access, and preventing the EU from aligning too closely with Washington. Its narrative emphasizes shared interests and downplays conflict. The EU, while recognizing the need for engagement, remains focused on addressing specific grievances within its established partner-competitor-rival framework, managing risks through de-risking, and upholding its values. This suggests that while communication channels are open, the two sides approach the relationship with significantly different priorities and definitions of success, potentially limiting the scope for convergence beyond managing immediate irritants.

VI. A Chorus of Voices: Stakeholder Perspectives and Divisions

The potential recalibration of EU-China relations through the lifting of sanctions is viewed through diverse lenses by various stakeholders within and outside the EU. These differing perspectives reflect the inherent complexities and competing interests at play.

A. Views within EU Institutions and Political Groups

• European Parliament (EP): As the institution most directly targeted by the 2021 sanctions, the EP plays a crucial role. Under President Metsola (EPP), it is actively negotiating the sanctions removal. The Parliament’s official red line, established by resolution, is that sanctions must be lifted before any consideration of the CAI can resume. However, beneath this unified precondition, nuances exist among the political groups:

• European People’s Party (EPP): As the largest group, the EPP’s position is influential. While historically more aligned with business interests and potentially viewing the CAI more favourably on economic grounds, the sanctioning of its own MEPs (Gahler, Lexmann) and President Metsola’s leadership in the talks suggest a firm stance on the sanctions issue itself. Their ultimate position on CAI revival post-sanctions remains to be seen but would likely weigh economic benefits against geopolitical and value concerns.
• Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D): Strongly condemned the sanctions, particularly those targeting their member Raphaël Glucksmann. They explicitly made the lifting of sanctions against MEPs a precondition for entering any talks on the CAI. The S&D group emphasizes the importance of values, human rights, and labour standards (particularly ILO conventions on forced labour) as conditions for supporting any trade deal with China.
• Renew Europe: Similarly condemned the sanctions against its MEP Ilhan Kyuchyuk and demanded their removal as a precondition for CAI discussions. As a centrist group, their stance likely balances economic interests with concerns about fair competition and values.
• Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA): Known for their strong stance on human rights and environmental issues, this group was particularly targeted (Reinhard Bütikofer was a prominent Green MEP). They are likely the most skeptical group regarding the CAI, even without the sanctions, due to concerns about human rights, labour standards, and environmental impact. They also voice concerns about potential Chinese influence and corruption within EU institutions.
• This landscape suggests that while the EP presented a united front in freezing the CAI due to the direct attack on its members, removing this trigger will likely expose underlying divergences on the merits of the CAI itself and the appropriate overall strategy towards China. Securing the sanctions lift opens the door not to automatic ratification, but to a potentially contentious internal debate within the Parliament, where values-based arguments (prominent in S&D and Greens/EFA) will clash with economic arguments potentially favoured by parts of the EPP and Renew.

• European Commission: The EU’s executive body, led by President von der Leyen (EPP), maintains a cautious approach. It avoids committing to CAI revival and consistently highlights the need for de-risking, addressing trade imbalances, countering unfair practices (e.g., subsidies, overcapacity), and raising concerns about China’s geopolitical alignment, particularly regarding Ukraine. The portfolio of the Trade Commissioner, Maroš Šefčovič, now explicitly includes “economic security,” signaling the priority given to risk management, especially concerning China. Former Trade VP Valdis Dombrovskis had previously stated the political context was “not conducive” to CAI ratification even before the current talks intensified.
• Council of the European Union: Representing the 27 Member States, the Council initially approved the EU’s Xinjiang sanctions. Its Political and Security Committee (PSC) was subsequently sanctioned by China. The Council’s position reflects the collective, often varying, interests of the Member States. It formally reaffirmed the EU’s multifaceted approach (partner, competitor, rival) in June 2023, but achieving consensus on specific actions can be challenging due to internal divisions.

B. Positions of Key Member States

National capitals exhibit diverse approaches to China, reflecting their unique economic interests, political orientations, and threat perceptions:

• Germany: As the EU’s largest economy and exporter to China, Germany holds a pivotal position. Traditionally prioritizing economic engagement, former Chancellor Scholz opposed EU tariffs on Chinese EVs. However, the country’s official 2023 China Strategy adopted a more cautious tone, emphasizing de-risking. A potential future government led by Friedrich Merz is anticipated to adopt a tougher stance, potentially aligning more closely with France on security and systemic rivalry concerns. Nonetheless, powerful German industries (automotive, chemical, machinery) remain heavily invested in China and exert domestic pressure for pragmatic relations.
• France: Often advocates for a more assertive EU posture, emphasizing the need to protect strategic industries and promote European strategic autonomy. Paris was a key driver behind the EU’s anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese EVs. France itself faced retaliatory Chinese measures, such as an anti-dumping probe into its cognac exports (though this probe has reportedly been delayed as a goodwill gesture). President Macron maintains high-level dialogue with President Xi.
• Italy & Spain: These Southern European nations have occasionally shown reluctance to join strong EU condemnations of China, for instance, reportedly opposing a statement on Chinese cyberattacks. This may reflect a greater focus on attracting Chinese investment or maintaining smoother economic ties. Italy had previously joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), although the current government has distanced itself. Spain continues to pursue its bilateral agenda with Beijing. The existence of extradition treaties between these countries and China also raises concerns among human rights groups.
• Netherlands: As a major trading hub and the EU’s largest importer of goods from China, the Netherlands has significant economic stakes. However, it reacted strongly against China’s 2021 sanctions and generally aligns with more security-conscious EU members, particularly regarding technology and critical infrastructure.
• Central & Eastern Europe: This region displays considerable diversity. Lithuania famously challenged Beijing over Taiwan, leading to economic coercion. Czechia also shows signs of a more critical stance. Conversely, Hungary stands out as China’s staunchest supporter within the EU, frequently blocking critical statements and welcoming significant Chinese investment, sometimes creating friction with Brussels. Discourse within the Visegrad Group (V4) reflects these broader divisions.
• This geographical and political fragmentation persists. A rough divide often emerges between Northern/Western Member States prioritizing security, reciprocity, and values, and Southern/Eastern states potentially placing greater emphasis on immediate economic benefits and investment attraction. This internal dynamic complicates the formation of a truly unified EU China policy and presents opportunities for China to leverage differences between capitals.

C. China’s Strategic Calculations

Beijing’s motivations for engaging in sanctions-lift negotiations appear primarily driven by pressing economic and geopolitical factors:

• Countering US Pressure: Facing high US tariffs and the prospect of deepening isolation from the US market, China sees stabilizing relations with the EU as crucial. The EU represents a vital market for Chinese goods and a potential, albeit limited, geopolitical counterweight to US influence.
• Reviving CAI / Improving Economic Ties: Lifting the sanctions is presented as a goodwill gesture explicitly aimed at unfreezing dialogue on the CAI and fostering a more positive economic relationship.
• Maintaining Market Access: Given domestic economic challenges and potential overcapacity issues exacerbated by US tariffs, ensuring continued access to the large EU single market is a key priority for Beijing.
• Projecting Stability and Multilateralism: China actively portrays itself as a steadfast and reliable partner committed to multilateralism, contrasting its approach with perceived US unilateralism and unpredictability under Trump.
• Preventing EU-US Alignment: Beijing seeks to prevent the EU from fully aligning with what it views as a US containment strategy, encouraging European strategic autonomy where it serves Chinese interests.
• While making this tactical overture on sanctions, China shows no sign of altering its fundamental positions on issues the EU deems critical. It continues to reject external criticism of its human rights record in Xinjiang and Hong Kong as interference in internal affairs. Its state-led economic model and pursuit of technological self-reliance remain core strategic pillars. This suggests a pattern of tactical flexibility driven by immediate pressures, overlaid on underlying strategic rigidity. China is willing to make a concession on sanctions to ease immediate tensions and pursue economic goals, but is unlikely to compromise on what it considers core interests or its fundamental governance model.

D. The US Stance and Potential Reactions

The United States is the unavoidable third actor in the EU-China dynamic. The Trump administration maintains a hardline stance, viewing China as the primary strategic competitor and employing high tariffs as a key policy tool. Washington actively seeks to limit other countries’ economic and technological engagement with China and may exert pressure on the EU to align more closely with its confrontational approach.

From the US perspective, a significant EU-China rapprochement, particularly one culminating in the revival of the CAI or perceived as weakening the transatlantic front against Beijing, could be viewed negatively and potentially lead to increased friction between Washington and Brussels. While the previous US administration coordinated its initial 2021 Xinjiang sanctions with the EU, the current administration’s reaction to the potential lifting of Chinese sanctions is less clear from available information, though likely cautious.

The US role is thus complex. On one hand, aggressive US trade actions against China inadvertently create the conditions that push Beijing to seek better ties with Brussels, acting as a catalyst for the current talks. On the other hand, direct or indirect US pressure on the EU to maintain a hard line, or negative reactions to perceived European concessions, could act as a spoiler, limiting the scope of EU-China engagement and forcing Brussels into uncomfortable strategic choices that test its desired autonomy. The EU’s ability to skillfully navigate this triangular diplomacy, balancing its interests with both superpowers, will be critical.

E. Business and Civil Society Concerns

Non-state actors also play a significant role in shaping the debate surrounding EU-China relations:

• EU Business Community: European companies, represented by bodies like the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, initially welcomed the CAI as a potential step towards improved market access and a more level playing field, despite acknowledging its imperfections. However, their optimism has been dampened by the subsequent deterioration of the business environment in China, citing increased politicization, regulatory hurdles, unfair competition from subsidized state players, and market access barriers. While businesses would likely welcome the increased stability and predictability that could result from lifting sanctions and resuming dialogue, they remain cautious about the prospects for genuine improvement in operating conditions. Key sectors like automotive, chemicals, and machinery, particularly in Germany, have substantial vested interests in the Chinese market, creating pressure for pragmatic engagement.
• Civil Society/Human Rights NGOs: Organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch maintain a strong focus on China’s human rights record, particularly concerning Uyghurs in Xinjiang, suppression in Hong Kong, and repression in Tibet. They applauded the EU’s 2021 sanctions and the EP’s decision to freeze the CAI. These groups express concern that economic interests might lead the EU to compromise on its values. They advocate for robust human rights conditionality in all agreements and urge the EU to utilize tools like the new Forced Labour Regulation to ensure products entering the EU market are not tainted by abuse.
• These two sets of stakeholders embody the fundamental tension at the heart of the EU’s China policy: the often-conflicting imperatives of promoting economic interests versus upholding democratic values and human rights. Businesses tend to favour engagement and predictable rules, potentially supporting deals like the CAI if they offer tangible benefits. NGOs prioritize accountability for rights abuses and argue against agreements that might legitimize or facilitate repression. EU policymakers must constantly navigate this difficult balancing act, seeking approaches that address both economic realities and normative commitments.

VII. Challenges and Opportunities in a Potential Reset

A potential resolution of the sanctions impasse opens up both opportunities and significant risks for the EU, requiring careful strategic consideration.

A. Assessing the Potential Benefits of Rapprochement

Successfully negotiating the removal of China’s retaliatory sanctions could yield several potential benefits for the EU:

• Stabilized Economic Relations: In a global environment marked by uncertainty and US protectionist tendencies, restoring a more stable and predictable relationship with China, a major trading partner, could be economically advantageous.
• Potential CAI Revival (Uncertain): While highly uncertain, lifting the primary obstacle could, in theory, reopen the path towards considering the CAI, which proponents argue could boost bilateral investment and improve market access conditions for EU firms in specific sectors.
• Reopened Dialogue Channels: Normalizing parliamentary contacts and easing diplomatic tensions could facilitate more effective dialogue on a range of contentious issues, from trade frictions and market access barriers to human rights concerns and global challenges like climate change.
• Enhanced Geopolitical Leverage: Demonstrating an ability to manage relations with China independently could enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and potentially provide leverage in its dealings with the United States, showing Washington that Brussels has alternative partnerships.
• Resolution of Specific Disputes: A warmer diplomatic climate might facilitate negotiated solutions to specific ongoing trade disputes, such as the EU’s investigation into Chinese EV subsidies or China’s probe into French cognac.

B. Identifying Enduring Risks and Obstacles

Despite potential upsides, pursuing rapprochement carries significant risks and faces numerous obstacles:

• Compromising Values: A major risk is that, in the pursuit of economic benefits or geopolitical expediency, the EU might downplay or ignore China’s severe human rights violations in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and elsewhere. This could damage the EU’s credibility as a values-based actor and undermine its own human rights policies. Notably, the EU’s own sanctions on Chinese officials remain in place.
• Unresolved Structural Issues: Lifting sanctions does not address the underlying structural economic conflicts related to China’s state-led model, subsidies, overcapacity, market access barriers, and lack of a level playing field. These issues are likely to persist and generate ongoing friction.
• Deepening Dependencies: Increased engagement without adequate safeguards could potentially deepen the EU’s reliance on China in critical sectors, running counter to the stated goals of the de-risking strategy.
• Transatlantic Friction: Moves perceived by Washington as overly conciliatory towards Beijing could antagonize the US, particularly under the Trump administration, potentially leading to negative consequences for the transatlantic relationship.
• Exacerbating EU Divisions: Differing priorities among Member States regarding China mean that any significant shift in policy could exacerbate internal EU tensions, making unified action more difficult.
• Uncertainty of Chinese Concessions: There is a risk that China may only partially lift sanctions (e.g., only on MEPs) or use the process primarily for tactical advantage without offering genuine concessions on core EU concerns. As discussed, the revival of the CAI remains highly uncertain.
• Persistent Security Concerns: Rapprochement does not eliminate ongoing security concerns related to Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, cyber threats, espionage activities, and the security implications of Chinese technology.

C. Implications for EU Strategy and Transatlantic Relations

The outcome of the sanctions negotiations will have significant implications. A successful and comprehensive removal of sanctions could signal a partial normalization of relations, allowing for the resumption of certain dialogues and potentially easing some economic tensions. However, given the multitude of unresolved issues and the prevailing de-risking paradigm, it is unlikely to herald a fundamental shift back towards a primarily cooperative relationship or guarantee the CAI’s ratification. The underlying competitive and rivalrous elements will persist.

Failure to secure a full lifting of sanctions, or a subsequent inability to make progress on other fronts like the CAI, could lead to renewed stagnation or even a further deterioration in relations, potentially reinforcing the arguments of those within the EU advocating for a harder line.

Regardless of the outcome, the process highlights the acute challenges the EU faces in operationalizing its desired strategic autonomy. Caught between US pressure and Chinese overtures, Brussels must constantly balance competing economic interests, security concerns, and normative commitments, all while managing internal divisions. Any move towards China risks alienating Washington, while a rigid stance aligned with the US could close off potentially beneficial dialogue and economic opportunities with Beijing, forcing the EU into difficult strategic trade-offs.

The potential “reset” offered by the sanctions lift appears, therefore, to be inherently limited. The enduring nature of the structural conflicts – economic, political, and value-based – combined with external geopolitical pressures, severely constrains the scope for genuine, deep rapprochement. The most probable scenario, even with a successful sanctions resolution, is a cautious, transactional, and partial normalization focused on managing immediate frictions, rather than a strategic realignment or the full realization of the ambitions embodied in the CAI negotiation process years ago.

VIII. Strategic Recommendations for the European Union

Based on the analysis of the current situation, historical context, and stakeholder perspectives, the following strategic recommendations are proposed for the European Union as it navigates the complex dynamics of its relationship with China, particularly concerning the sanctions negotiations:

A. Navigating the Negotiations: Leverage and Red Lines

1. Maintain Unity on Preconditions: The EU, particularly the European Parliament, should maintain cross-party unity in insisting that the lifting of all relevant Chinese retaliatory sanctions – encompassing not only sitting MEPs but also parliamentary bodies like DROI, Council bodies like the PSC, and potentially targeted think tanks and academics – is an absolute precondition before any formal consideration of the CAI can recommence. The ambiguity regarding the scope of China’s offer should be leveraged to push for this comprehensive resolution.
2. Clarify Sufficiency: Clearly and consistently communicate to Beijing that lifting sanctions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for potential CAI ratification. Explicitly reiterate that other significant concerns, particularly regarding the effective implementation of labour rights commitments (including ILO conventions on forced labour), the broader human rights situation in China, and the enforceability of level playing field provisions, must also be addressed satisfactorily.
3. Utilize Geopolitical Leverage: Recognize that China’s current willingness to negotiate stems partly from pressures related to US trade policies. Use this context as leverage to seek tangible concessions from China that go beyond the symbolic lifting of sanctions. This could include concrete steps to improve market access for EU companies in specific sectors, address identified trade irritants, or provide greater transparency on subsidies.

B. Balancing Values, Economic Interests, and Geopolitics

4. Uphold Values Consistently: Continue to raise human rights concerns (Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Tibet, freedom of expression) publicly and privately in all engagements with China, linking respect for universal values to the overall quality and potential of the bilateral relationship. Actively utilize existing and new EU tools, such as the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (maintaining existing listings unless conditions demonstrably improve) and the recently adopted Forced Labour Regulation, to ensure EU policy coherence. Avoid any perception of sacrificing fundamental values for short-term economic or geopolitical gains.
5. Pursue De-Risking Vigorously: Maintain and intensify efforts under the de-risking strategy, irrespective of the diplomatic atmosphere surrounding the sanctions talks. Focus on concrete actions to diversify critical supply chains, boost domestic industrial capacity in strategic sectors (e.g., green tech, digital tech, health), and robustly employ defensive instruments (TDIs, investment screening, potential outbound investment controls) to counter unfair trade practices and mitigate security risks.
6. Engage Selectively and Realistically: Continue dialogue and seek cooperation with China on global challenges where interests align (e.g., climate change mitigation, pandemic preparedness, biodiversity). Explore potential for cooperation on technical standards. However, maintain a realistic assessment of the limitations imposed by systemic rivalry, the persistent trust deficit (exacerbated by issues like Ukraine), and China’s own strategic priorities. Avoid overly optimistic expectations for deep strategic convergence.

C. Enhancing EU Cohesion and Strategic Foresight

7. Strengthen Internal EU Coordination: Intensify efforts to build consensus and coordinate positions among EU institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament) and Member States. Foster mechanisms for regular dialogue and information sharing to bridge the divides between Member States with differing perspectives on China, aiming for a more unified and resilient EU approach. Enhance shared intelligence and analytical capacity regarding China’s political and economic developments.
8. Develop Proactive and Offensive Strategies: Move beyond reactive measures and develop a more proactive, long-term EU strategy for managing relations with China. This should refine the EU’s own definition of economic security, articulate clear objectives, and develop offensive tools – such as strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries (e.g., US, Japan, India, ASEAN) and promoting the EU’s own standards and models globally – alongside existing defensive measures.
9. Manage Transatlantic Relations Proactively: Engage in transparent and consistent communication with the United States regarding the EU’s strategy, intentions, and red lines concerning China. Aim to manage potential friction and misunderstandings while clearly defending the EU’s right to pursue its own interests and strategic autonomy. Develop contingency plans to navigate different potential US policy scenarios towards both the EU and China.

Invest in Long-Term Analysis: Support independent research and analysis within the EU focused on understanding China’s complex internal dynamics, economic trajectory, technological advancements, and long-term strategic goals. This will help avoid miscalculations and inform more effective, evidence-based EU policymaking.